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Wagner and Eccles: Participant Self-Direction of Account Balances: Investment Advice

of
Self-Direction
Participant
Account Balances: Investment
Advice or Investment Education?
Marcia S. Wagner and Robert N. Eccles *
With the exponential growth of pension plans
established pursuant to section 401(k) of the Internal
2
Revenue Code (the "Code")' more and more employees are
responsible for making the investment decisions on which
the comfort and security of their retirement years will
depend. In other words, where professional trustees and
investment managers once, practically exclusively,
invested pension plan assets, more and more plans are
providing that participants themselves invest their
pension plan assets.
Freed of the responsibility for investing pension plan
assets or hiring professionals to do so, employers have
nonetheless been concerned about the competence of their
employees to direct the investment of those assets. To
assist their employees in directing the investment of their
pension plan assets, some employers have hired others to
provide employees with either investment education or
investment advice. Providing investment education means
providing investment information to employees to assist
them in making informed investment decisions - without
Marcia S. Wagner has her own law firm, Marcia S. Wagner, Esq. &
Associates, P.C., Boston, Massachusetts. Robert N. Eccles, is a partner
at O'Melveny & Myers, Washington, D.C. The authors were counsel to
Trust Company of the West in receiving Prohibited Transaction
Exemption 97-60. Marcia S. Wagner has also written on the issues
discussed in this Article in The Provision of Investment Advice Under
ProhibitedTransactionExemption 97-60, TAx MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION
PLANNING JouRNAL 3-10 (Jan. 2. 1998).
1I.R.C. § 401(k) (1998) (providing for cash or deferred arrangements).
2 Although this Article refers to persons with pension plan assets for
which they direct the investment as employees or participants, the
same principles apply to beneficiaries of pension plan assets who direct
the investment of those assets. Thus, the word participant in this
Article should be read to include both employees and beneficiaries
where appropriate.
*
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providing employees with the kind of individualized
investment information that constitutes investment
advice. In this context, for investment information to be
considered investment advice, the information must be
understood to be "a primary basis for investment decisions
with respect to plan assets" and must be individualized
and based on the particular needs of the participant
"regarding such matters as, among other things,
or strategy, overall portfolio
investment policies
3
of plan investments."
diversification
or
composition
The first section of this Article summarizes4
Department of Labor (DOL) Interpretive Bulletin 96-1,
concerning investment education. The second section
describes a prohibited transaction exemption received by
Trust Company of the West (TCW) to permit it to offer5
investment advice to certain pension plan participants.
The third section explains the advantages of the
investment advisory approach.
I. DOL INTERPRETIVE BULLETIN 96-I
A. BACKGROUND
A person who is otherwise a fiduciary with regard to
pension plan assets over which a participant has
investment control is not responsible for any losses that6
result from the participant's exercise of such control.
Thus, a plan sponsor, subject to regulations adopted by
DOL, 7 can set up an employee pension plan that has
individual accounts for each employee and for which each
participant, not the plan sponsor, is responsible for
managing the investments ("individually directed pension
plan").
3 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c) (1998).
4 Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Participant Investment Education
[hereinafter Interpretive Bulletin], 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 (1998).
5 Prohibited Transaction Exemption 97-60 [hereinafter PTE], 62 Fed.
Reg. 59,744 (1997).
6 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended
(ERISA) § 404(c)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(B) (1998).
7 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (1998).
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A plan sponsor may still have fiduciary responsibility
for investment advice provided to a participant who directs
the investment of his or her individual account assets if
the sponsor provides the participant with investment
advice for compensation. 8 A service provider hired by a
plan sponsor to advise participants would also be a
fiduciary with respect to the individually directed pension
plan. Moreover, a sponsor who hired a service provider to
provide participants with investment advice would be
required by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) to be prudent in the choice of a fiduciary
to provide investment advice 9 and could even be subject to
co-fiduciary liability with the investment adviser if the plan
sponsor chose imprudently.' 0
B. DOL CLARIFIES WHEN PARTICIPANT INVESTMENT
EDUCATION IS NOT INVESTMENT ADVICE

Because DOL shared the concern of many employers
that employees might not be competent to direct the
investment of their individually directed pension plan
assets,"1 the Department issued Interpretive Bulletin 96-1
on June 11, 1996. The purpose of the Interpretive Bulletin
is to encourage plan sponsors to provide participants with
investment information without concern on the part of the
sponsor about the fiduciary duties the sponsor might
assume if the investment information provided were
considered to be investment advice. The Interpretive
Bulletin accomplishes this by clarifying when investment
8 ERISA § 3(21)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. §1002(21)(A)(ii) (1998).
9Specifically, a plan sponsor must act "prudently and in the sole
interest of plan participants and beneficiaries...... Interpretive Bulletin,
29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1(e) (1998).
,oSee id. Specifically, the Interpretive Bulletin provides:
[t]he designation of an investment advisor to serve as a fiduciary may
give rise to co-fiduciary liability if the person making and continuing

such designation in doing so fails to act prudently and solely in the
interest of plan participants and beneficiaries; or knowingly
participates in, conceals or fails to make reasonable efforts to correct
a known breach by the investment advisor. Id.
I See Interpretive Bulletin, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 (b) (1998).
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education is not "investment advice" for purposes of the
12
definition of "fiduciary" in section 3(21)(A)(ii) of ERISA.
Specifically, the Interpretive Bulletin describes "a series of
graduated safe harbors under ERISA for plan sponsors
and service providers who provide participants and
beneficiaries with four increasingly specific categories of
investment information and materials - plan information,
general financial and investment information, asset
13
allocation models and interactive investment materials."
Neither of the first two safe harbors - for plan
information and general financial and investment
information applies to information about specific
investment alternatives available to participants under a
plan. In contrast, the third and the fourth safe harbors
permit the use in investment education materials of specific
investment models incorporating actual investment
alternatives available under the plans offered to
participants. The use of the models in participant
investment education materials is subject to the following
restrictions.
The third safe harbor - for asset allocation models permits a plan sponsor or service provider to make
available to employees models "of asset allocation
portfolios of hypothetical individuals with different time
horizons and risk profiles, where:
(i) Such models are based on generally accepted
investment theories that take into account the historic
returns of different asset classes (e.g., equities, bonds,
or cash) over defined periods of time;
(ii) all material facts and assumptions on which
such models are based (e.g., retirement ages, life
expectancies, income levels, financial resources,
replacement income ratios, inflation rates, and rates of
return) accompany the models;
12The Interpretive Bulletin does not address the question of when
advice is provided for compensation. Interpretive Bulletin, 29 C.F.R. §
2509.96-1(b) (1998).
13 Interpretive Bulletin, 61 Fed. Reg. 29,586, 29,586 (1996).
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(iii) to the extent that an asset allocation model
identifies any specific investment alternative available
under the plan, the model is accompanied by a
statement indicating that other investment alternatives
having similar risk and return characteristics may be
available under the plan and identifying where
information on those investment alternatives may be
obtained; and
(iv) the asset allocation models are accompanied
participants or
by a statement indicating that . .
beneficiaries should consider their other assets,
income, and investments . . . in addition to their
14
interests in the plan."
The fourth safe harbor - for interactive investment
materials - permits a plan sponsor or service provider to
make available to participants materials, including
worksheets, questionnaires and software, that enable the
participant to estimate his or her own future retirement
income needs and to "assess the impact of different asset
allocations on retirement income" as long as there is "an
objective correlation between the asset allocations
generated by the materials and the information and data"
provided by the plan sponsor or service provider and as
long as restrictions similar to the ones applied to asset
allocation models are met. 15
C. ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY UNDER
INTERPRETIVE BULLETIN 96-1
The Interpretive Bulletin also makes clear that hiring a
person to provide investment educational services to
participants in individually directed pension plans is "an
exercise of discretionary authority or control with respect
to management of the plan"'16 just as is the hiring of a
person to provide investment advisory services. 17 Thus, the
Interpretive Bulletin, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-i(d)(3) (1998).
§ 2509.96-1(d)(4).
16 Id. § 2509.96-1(e).
17 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
14
5

1 Id.
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act of employing a service provider to provide investment
educational services is subject to the prudent man
standard of care in section 404(a) of ERISA. 18 A plan
sponsor must be prudent in selecting (and continuing to
retain) a service provider, even though the sponsor neither
has liability for the education provided nor for the
consequences of investment decisions made by participants
who have received the education.
II. PROHIBITED TRANSACTION EXEMPTION 97-60
A. BACKGROUND

Although the Interpretive Bulletin provided guidance
for plan sponsors who wish to offer investment education
to participants, it did not offer comparable guidance for
sponsors who wish to offer participants more significant
assistance in the form of investment advice. As noted
above, the act of hiring someone to provide investment
advice to an individually directed pension plan is a
fiduciary act. In addition, a service provider hired to
provide plan participants with investment advice is a
fiduciary. 19 Moreover, if the service provider also offers the
investment alternatives about which participants are
receiving investment advice, then the service provider may
have committed a transaction prohibited by ERISA unless
the service provider has received an exemption from the
application of provisions of that Act.
The following is a description of one program under
which investment advice may be offered to certain pension
plan participants and the prohibited transaction exemption
that permits .the offer of the program under specified
conditions. For reasons set forth in a later section of this
Article, 20 the authors believe that the conditions for receipt of
the prohibited transaction exemption would also protect
participants from breaches of fiduciary responsibility by the
sponsor and the service provider and, thus, lessen the
1829 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1998).
19See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
20 See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
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liability for any sponsor who hired a service provider with a
similar prohibited transaction exemption to provide
investment advice to participants.

B. DESCRIPTION OF THE
TCW PORTFOLIO SOLUTIONS PROGRAM
21
In Prohibited Transaction Exemption 97-60 (PTE),
DOL granted exemptive relief22 under section 408(a) of
ERISA23 and section 4975(c)(2) of the Code 24 on behalf of
The TCW Group, Inc., and its wholly owned subsidiaries
TCW and TCW Funds Management, Inc., the investment
25
adviser to the TCW Galileo Funds, Inc. ("Galileo Funds").
In the PTE, DOL considered TICW Portfolio Solutions," a
program under which TCW could render investment
advice to participants in individually directed pension
plans. The program would provide an individual plan
participant responsible for the investment of his or her
account balance with a convenient way to benefit from the
knowledge and experience of professional investment
advisers and thereby receive advice concerning which of
the investment vehicles offered under the program would
represent an appropriate allocation of the assets in that
individual's account.

PTE, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,744 (1997).
The relief granted was from the application of section 406(b) of
ERISA to certain proposed transactions involving TCW and fiduciaries
of individually directed pension plans whose participants receive
investment advice from TCW.
TCW also received relief for the proposed purchase and sale by
individually directed pension plans of units in commingled trusts
described below and of shares of the Galileo Funds. The grant of relief
for the purchase and sale transactions is not discussed further in this
Article.
2329 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (1998).
24
I.R.C. § 4975(c)(2) (1998).
25
The Galileo Funds is a series mutual fund, an open-end investment
company, that has separate series that operate as individual mutual
funds. See generally PTE, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,744, 59,746 (1997).
21

22
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The program could be offered to independent
fiduciaries 26 of individually directed pension plans. 2 7 In
accordance with its responsibilities under Title I of
ERISA, 28 an independent fiduciary would have to review
the program before offering it under the pension plan.

1. TCW Portfolio Solutions Trusts
Under TCWs proposed program, TCW would
recommend to participants one of a number of trusts
maintained under the program or a money market fund or
similar vehicle 29 as an investment vehicle for the
participant's account balance. Multiple trusts would be
30
established, structured as separate commingled trusts.
Each trust would hold, in varying proportions, shares of
some or all of the mutual funds offered by the Galileo
Funds.
The mix of mutual funds in each commingled trust
would be designed to accommodate the investment needs
and risk tolerances of a different profile of a participant
with the salient factors being the participant's financial
objectives, time horizon, other savings and risk tolerance.
The trusts could range from aggressively structured
(generally comprised of mutual funds invested primarily in
equities), to conservatively structured (generally comprised
26

An independent fiduciary would be a fiduciary who has
discretionary authority with regard to an individually directed pension
plan and who is not affiliated with TCW. The term could include named
fiduciaries of the plan such as the plan sponsor or plan administrator or
any fiduciary responsible for selecting investment vehicles for the

pension
plan.
27

TCWs program would only be offered to sophisticated plans, that is

those
with a minimum of $5 million in plan assets.
28
See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, Title 1, 88 Stat. 832 (1974) (codified
as amended in 29 U.S.C.).
29 The money market fund or similar option would be provided so that
TCWs program could comply with the requirements of 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.404c-1 (1998).
3°Each commingled trust would be a group trust, satisfying all
requirements of Revenue Ruling 81-100, 1981-1 C.B. 326, and thus,

qualifying for tax exemption under section 501(a) of the Code. I.R.C.
. 501(a) (1998).
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invested

95

primarily in fixed income

TCW would employ a financial expert to construct
appropriate asset allocation models for the commingled
trusts, using generally accepted principles of modem
portfolio theory. The financial expert would be
independent from and have no previous pre-existing
relationship with TCW or its affiliates. 31 The asset
allocation models would not be static, but rather the
financial expert, in its sole professional discretion, would
adjust them, taking into consideration the investment
goals and risk tolerances that the models represent and
changes in the economy and market conditions. The
financial expert would be solely responsible for deciding
how the models might best be implemented by selecting
the mutual funds each commingled trust held and the
weightings thereof.
The commingled trusts might comprise all or part of
the investment alternatives available to a participant in an
individually directed pension plan.
2. Investment Advice Offered to
Participants Under the Program
An integral part of the program would be the
investment advice offered to participants. TCW would
provide each plan participant with worksheets 32 that
would elicit from the participant his or her retirement
funding needs, risk tolerance and life cycle stage. Upon
completion of the worksheets, the participant's responses
would be analyzed and the participant would receive a
written recommendation from TCW of an appropriate
commingled trust.33 There would be no separate fee at the
31 In addition, no more than five percent of the financial expert's gross
income in any taxable year could be derived from TCW or its affiliates.
32 The worksheets would be formulated by an independent expert.
33 Because the worksheets would take into account risk tolerances,

TCW might find itself in the position of recommending a more

conservative commingled trust than would be the case if the worksheets
had only a mathematical basis with no behavioral or psychological
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trust level for the provision of this investment advice;
however, the costs of the program (for example, the costs of
developing and implementing the asset allocation models
and the worksheets) 34 would be paid by TCW and TCW
35
would be reimbursed for such expenses by the trusts.
Whether a participant elected to invest in the
recommended commingled trust would be entirely within
the participant's discretion. A participant might disregard
the recommended trust and invest in another trust.
Moreover, some participants might not elect to participate
in the asset allocation program at all, in such cases a
person independent of TCW, generally the participant,
would elect in which trust to invest the pension plan
assets.
3. Disclosure Under the Program
TCW would provide plan sponsors with full disclosure
concerning the composition of the commingled trusts and
concerning fees and expenses charged at the mutual fund
and the trust level. TCW also would provide sponsors with
a quantitative annual report by which each sponsor could
determine if the program had attained its objectives.
component. Since equity-based mutual funds provide TCW with higher
fees (and generally higher profits) than fixed-income mutual funds,
TCW would not necessarily maximize its short-term return by
incorporating the behavioral or psychological component into the
worksheets.
34 Other trust level expenses would include expenses payable to
regulatory authorities, accounting, auditing and legal expenses, clerical
and administrative expenses, expenses of printing and mailing reports,
expenses for computer programmers, certain insurance and fidelity
bond premiums and other expenses incurred by each commingled trust
in the ordinary course of its business.
35 Because TCW generally would pay for direct expenses and then
seek reimbursement from the commingled trusts, the payment of
expenses could be viewed as an extension of credit between a plan and a
party-in-interest prohibited under sections 406(a)(1)(B), 406(a)(1)(D)
and 406(b)(2) of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(1)(B), 1 106(a)(1)(D) and
1106(b)(2) (1998). However, relief likely would be available under
Prohibited Transaction Class Exemption 80-26, 45 Fed. Reg. 28,545
(1980) concerning interest free loans between a plan and a partyin-interest.
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Finally, participants also would receive full disclosure
concerning the composition, operating costs, and
historical performance of the commingled trusts and a
description of the Galileo Funds before directing their
account balances.
C. EXEMPTIVE RELIEF GRANTED BY PTE 97-60
Section 406(b) of ERISA36 prohibits a fiduciary from
dealing with a pension plan in the fiduciary's own interest
or for the fiduciary's own account; from acting on behalf of
a party whose interests are adverse to a plan in any
transaction involving the plan; or from receiving
consideration for the fiduciary's own account from a party
dealing with the plan in connection with a transaction
37
involving plan assets.
DOL gives several examples of transactions prohibited
by section 406(b) in a rule adopted under section 408(b)(2)
3629 U.S.C. §I 106(b) (1998).
37

Section 406(a) of ERISA prohibits a fiduciary with respect to an
employee benefit plan from causing the plan to engage in certain
prohibited transactions, including the sale or exchange of property
between a plan and a party-in-interest, the furnishing of services
between the plan and a party-in-interest and the transfer to, or use by
or for the benefit of, a party-in-interest of any assets of the plan. ERISA
§§ 406(a)(1)(A), 406(a)(1)(C) and 406(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(1)(A),
1106(a)(1)(C) and 1106(a)(1)(D) (1998).
Section 408(b)(2) of ERISA provides that the prohibitions provided in
section 406 shall not apply to the provision of services "necessary for
the establishment or operation of the plan, if no more than reasonable
compensation is paid therefor." 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2) (1998). DOL
regulations state that section 408(b)(2) of ERISA "does not contain an
29 C.F.R. §
exemption from acts described in section 406(b)......
2550.408b-2(a)(3) (1998). Although section 408(b)(2), thus, does not
resolve the question of whether TCWs program would involve
transactions prohibited under section 406(b), section 408(b)(2) would
apply to transactions that would otherwise be prohibited under section
406(a) of ERISA. Since an independent fiduciary of a sophisticated
benefit plan would have to decide to enroll in the program and TCW
would have every incentive to ensure that services were provided at the
Trust level in a cost effective manner because it would not profit from
providing such services, the authors believe that the provision of
services under the program should not be a violation of section 406(a) of
ERISA, because such transactions would likely be exempt under
section 408(b)(2) of ERISA.
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of ERISA. 38 Under DOL's second example, an investment
adviser ("C") by recommending the purchase of an
insurance contract on which C would receive a
commission from the insurance company, engages in an
act prohibited by section 406(b), even if C fully discloses
the reasons for the recommendation and the fact that it
will receive a commission, and even though an
independent fiduciary (a fiduciary of the plan independent
of C) considers the recommendation and approves the
transaction. Similarly, because TCW could be deemed to
be a fiduciary of individually directed pension plans
enrolled in its program by virtue of the investment advice it
would provide to participants in such plans, 39 TCW could
be deemed to engage in a prohibited transaction if it
advised a participant to invest in one of the more
aggressive equity-based commingled trusts because TCW
generally would receive higher net fees (and, thus could
receive higher net profits) from such trusts.
Because of the risk that an offer of investment advice
to participants in its program might be viewed as involving
an act of prohibited self-dealing, TCW sought and received
an exemption from the provisions of section 406(b) with
respect to the proffer of investment advice. In support of its
request, TCW noted that its proposed exemption was
similar to Prohibited Transaction Exemption 93-59
40
received by Prudential Mutual Fund Management, Inc.,
in which DOL permitted an investment adviser affiliated
with the applicant to evaluate and recommend a mutual
fund investment mix comprising mutual funds that were
advised by the applicant. TCW also cited the similar
41
exemption received by Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc.
38 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(0 (1998).
39

Because the participants under the individually directed pension

plans often would be financially unsophisticated, it is anticipated that
any advice rendered by TCW would be relied upon by participants.
Therefore, provision of the advice could render TCW a fiduciary of the
plans according to the definition of fiduciary in section 3(21)(A) of
ERISA. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
40 58 Fed. Reg. 47,290 (1993).
41 Prohibited Transaction Exemption 92-77, 57 Fed. Reg. 45,833
(1992).
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III. THE ADVANTAGES OF INVESTMENT ADVICE
OVER INVESTMENT EDUCATION
There are several advantages to a plan sponsor in
hiring a service provider who provides investment advice
rather than investment education.
First, the provider can give participants the
investment advice they desire and need. Consequently,
plan participation and retention rates should increase.
Second, any prohibited transaction
exemption
received by a service provider offering investment advice
would contain protective conditions that could protect the
plan sponsor as well as participants.
As noted above, a plan sponsor is responsible for the
selection and oversight of the service provider whether the
service provider is an educator or an adviser. 4 2 Because a
prohibited transaction exemption relieves liability from the
prohibitions of the self-dealing provisions of section 406 of
ERISA but does not provide relief from the responsibility of
prudence and care under section 404,4 3 DOL must, in
order to grant a prohibited transaction exemption, find
that the transaction is in the interests of plan
participants. 4 Therefore, DOL only grants exemptions that
incorporate
conditions and
procedures
that the
Department believes will ensure, to the greatest extent
possible, that the transactions it exempts are prudent.
42 See supra notes 9 and 16-18 and accompanying text. Also, as noted

above hiring by a plan sponsor of a person as an investment adviser

may result in co-fiduciary liability under section 405 of ERISA (29
U.S.C. § 1105) if the fiduciary hiring the adviser fails to carry out the
designation in a manner consistent with the general fiduciary
responsibility provisions of ERISA. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text. As a practical matter, the liability of a plan sponsor
in selecting TCW or any other fiduciary where conduct is circumscribed
by an exemption is no greater than the liability a plan sponsor would
incur
in selecting an educator.
43
ERISA § 408(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (1998).
"Id. § 1108(a)(2).
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a
Similarly, DOL must also find that the terms of 45
transaction are protective of the rights of participants.
Accordingly, unless the Department is comfortable that
the terms of a transaction are favorable to participants, it
will not issue an exemption. It is not unusual for the
Department to insist that the terms of a transaction be
made more favorable to participants than the requester of
the exemption had initially proposed.
The caution of DOL has had a predictable result.
Exhaustive computer searches have failed to uncover any
case in which a party complying with the conditions of an
individual prohibited transaction exemption was held
liable for a breach of its fiduciary responsibilities. Further,
the authors have been unable to locate a single reported
case in which a fiduciary breach was even alleged against
such a person. Thus, as long as a service provider has a
prohibited transaction exemption, complies with the
conditions of that exemption, and fulfills its responsibilities
to the individually directed pension plans, a plan sponsor
could take comfort in the likelihood that its duties of
prudence and care in hiring the service provider have been
met. 46
Third, if a plan sponsor hired a service provider
offering investment advice, the sponsor would not have to
monitor whether the provider actually provided investment
education or investment advice. In contrast, if a plan
sponsor hired a service provider who claimed only to offer
investment education, the sponsor would have to monitor
45 Id. §1 108(a)(3).
46

A

plan

sponsor

would

have

had

to

have

made

an

initial

determination that the investment advice furnished by the service
provider would be likely to be helpful to its employees. Moreover, a
fiduciary who hires a service provider that performs well could still be

subject to equitable relief, such as removal, for not following proper
procedures in hiring the provider. See Brock v. Robbins, 830 F.2d 640,
648 (7th Cir. 1987). However, the disclosures that a service provider

would be required to make to receive a prohibited transaction
exemption are intended to ensure that proper procedures are used in
the selection process. For the information provided by TCW under its
program, see section II.B.3 of this Article (Disclosure Under the
Program), supra.
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whether the investment education provided slipped over
the line into investment advice. If the investment
education were actually investment advice, then the plan
sponsor might be found to have hired a fiduciary on behalf
of the plan, which fiduciary would not have received a
prohibited transaction exemption addressing any possible
self-dealing issues involved in the arrangement.
Fourth, hiring a service provider who offers investment
advice rather than investment education protects a plan
sponsor from certain ambiguities in the interplay of state
and federal law.
A service provider offering investment education may
be subject to state law, 47 rather than to ERISA. This may
permit an educator with a financial interest in which
investment vehicle a participant selects to skew the
investment education to lead to the selection of vehicles
that result in higher fees and profits for the educator
without liability for the educator under ERISA. Such a
scenario would enhance the possibility of liability under
ERISA for the plan sponsor for either improper selection or
inadequate monitoring of the educator.
Finally, many of the different state laws to which a
service provider offering investment education might be
subject may well have different standards than ERISA. If
an educator were held liable for a violation of state law, the
holding might be evidence in a federal court that a plan
sponsor had not satisfied ERISA's prudence requirement
in selecting and monitoring the educator. On the other
hand, if the educator were not held liable under state law
for something that would be a violation of ERISA because
47 See Coyne v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457 (4th Cir. 1996); Curtis v.
Nevada Bonding, 53 F.3d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir. 1995); Dukes v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 355 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 564 (1995). In contrast, most state laws do not apply to a service
provider acting as a fiduciary to a pension plan subject to ERISA. See
ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. §I 144(a) (1998), which generally preempts
the application of all state laws to fiduciaries except for those laws that
relate to banking, insurance, securities, and generally applicable
criminal law.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999

15

Villanova Journal of Law and Investment Management, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 5

102

VILLANOVA JOURNAL OF LAW AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT

of less restrictive standards in the state law, the plan
sponsor might still be liable for the imprudent selection or
monitoring of the service provider since the less restrictive
state laws might have deprived the plan of a cause of
action against the educator.
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